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DAMNING WITH FULSOME PRAISE:
ASSESSING THE UNIQUENESS OF AN ARTIST
OR PERFORMER AS A CONDITION TO ENJOIN
PERFORMANCE OF PERSONAL SERVICE
CONTRACTS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW
SHARON F. CARTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The paradigmatic contract in the entertainment industry has
traditionally been considered to be the informal handshake, at least
in the mythos of Hollywood.' If this impression were ever true, it
no longer is. The cause of action for breach of an entertainment
contract is alive and well and flourishing in the industry. 2 Litiga-
tion includes suits against actors and other performers for breach-
* Professor, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center; B.A.,
C.W. Post College, 1976; J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, 1979; L.L.M.,
George Washington University National Law Center, 1986. The author would like
to thank her research assistant, Christopher Wigand, without whose invaluable
assistance this article could not have been completed.
1. See Rivera Live: Pamela Anderson Lee Being Sued By Movie Producer For Breach of
Contract (NBC television broadcast, May 8, 1997).
2. See Joe Baltake, In Hollywood, Backing out Is Art dujour, TULSA WoRLD, Aug.
5, 1996, at A14 (discussing John Travolta being sued by Mandalay for "egregious
breach of contract" after walking off set of "The Double"); Foster Sues PolyGramfor
Breach of Contract, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 8, 1996, at B12 (discussing Jodie
Foster's suit against her production company for breach of verbal agreement for
the film "The Game"); Brian St. Pierre, The Well-Rehearsed Life of Faye Dunaway /
Actress' Autobiography Reveals Single-Minded Determination, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 26, 1995,
at 5 (discussing Faye Dunaway's suit against producers of her first two movies);
Pamela Warrick, Acting on a Legality When the Real World Intrudes on Hollywood, Who
Wins? An Actress Who Lost a 'Melrose Place' Role Because of Her Pregnancy Plans to Find
Out, L.A.TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at El (discussing Hunter Tylo's suit against Melrose
(197)
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ing contracts based on what are euphemistically and generically
referred to as "artistic differences."3 Studios and producers have
also been sued for breaching contracts with performers for reasons
ranging from negative publicity surrounding the performer's name
to an actress' unexpected pregnancy.4 Other typical suits involve
disputes regarding accounting of profits, claimed pilferage of credit
for authorship, the degree of specificity needed for formation of
entertainment law contracts and ownership of rights deriving from
evolving technology. 5
The most interesting, idiosyncratic, and yet consistent aspect of
these contract cases is the nature of the remedy pursued and ac-
corded. Traditionally, specific performance is not available in per-
sonal services cases. In the seminal opinion of Lumley v. Wagner,6 an
opera singer breached a contract to perform in one theater in or-
der to perform in another.7 The court declined to enforce her ob-
ligation to perform in the original theater, choosing instead to
enforce a negative covenant precluding her from performing in any
other theater.8 The psychology employed by the court was that the
singer would certainly opt for performing in her original theater
when precluded from singing anywhere else. 9 While in that case
the singer thwarted the court's ploy and chose not to perform, the
reasoning has been adopted in cases in both the sports and en-
tertainment industries.
Place for firing her for "material changes" when she became pregnant shortly
before joining show).
3. See Baltake, supra note 2, at A14.
4. See, e.g., Names & Faces Celebrity Update, ORLANDO SENTnNEL,June 22, 1997, at
A2; Chris Nashawaty, News & Notes/Monitor, ENT. WKL., May 24, 1996, at 18; Person
to Person, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 7, 1996, at El; Short Stuff THE NEWS & OB-
SERVER (Raleigh, NC),June 22, 1997, at A2; Felicia Wilson, Actress Sues Spelling for
Melrose' Eviction, AUSTIN Am.-STATESMAN, May 15, 1996, at B10.
5. See"Brian Lowry, 'Undercover' Stars End Their Holdout, L.A. TIMES, July 26,
1996, at F2. Some litigation, of course, derives from nothing more substantive
than artistic temper tantrums and greed. Actors Malik Yoba and Michael DeLo-
renzo, stars of the television series "New York Undercover," caved in and ended
their brief walk-out when confronted with a $1.2 million suit alleging breach of
contract. See id. The actors had sought, among other perks, a raise to $75,000 per
episode, a gym, a star trailer, and better food, along with increased creative con-
trol. See id.
6. 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).
7. See id. at 687-88.
8. See id. at 693.
9. See id. at 693-94. The court recognized that its power to enjoin other per-
formances would have the effect of binding the parties' consciences to perform
their agreements. See id. at 693. The court, however, denied that it was doing
indirectly what it could not do directly. See Lumley, 42 Eng. Rep. at 693.
[Vol. 5: p. 197
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Lumley v. Wagner has been the progenitor of a long series of
cases in sports law.10 In sports, the inquiry has often revolved
around the "uniqueness" or "replaceability" of the athlete, a prereq-
uisite to the court's ordering the equitable relief of enforcing the
express or implied negative covenant. This article explores the par-
allel world of remedies in entertainment law, and compares it with
its sports law counterparts.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Lumley v. Wagner
In an 1851 contract, originally in French and translated for the
court, Johanna Wagner, "cantatrice of the Court of His Majesty the
King of Prussia," promised to sing at Lumley's Her Majesty's Thea-
tre in London for a three month period.11 The contract specified
the operatic roles she would be singing, and stipulated that those
"parts belong exclusively to Mademoiselle Wagner, and any other
cantatrice shall not presume to sing them during the three months
of her engagement. ' 12 Further, under a "pay or play" arrangement,
even if circumstances prevented the presentation of those operas,
Lumley would still be bound to compensate Wagner. 13 An addi-
tional clause, subsequently contracted to by a Mr. Bacher, who al-
legedly was acting on Wagner's behalf, provided that
"Mademoiselle Wagner engages herself not to use her talents at any
other theatre, nor in any concert or reunion, public or private,
without the written authorization of Mr. Lumley."14
10. See, e.g., New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football
Club, Inc., 291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961); Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Brad-
dock, 90 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1937); Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Carnera, 52
F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1931); Arias v. Solis, 754 F. Supp. 290 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Madison
Square Garden Boxing, Inc. v. Shavers, 434 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Nassau
Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Boston Profl Hockey Ass'n v.
Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass.), remanded on other grounds, 472 F.2d 127 (1"
Cir. 1972); Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 304 F. Supp. 1193
(N.D. Cal.), affd, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969); Detroit Football Co. v. Robinson,
186 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. La.), affd, 283 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1960); Winnipeg Rugby
Football Club v. Freeman, 140 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ohio 1955); Weegham v. Kille-
fer, 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich.), aff'd, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir. 1914); Central New York
Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 181 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio C.P. 1961); American Ass'n Base-
ball Club v. Pickett, 8 Pa. C. 232 (C.P. 1890); Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 515
S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348
S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
11. See Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 687-88 (Ch. 1852).
12. See id. at 688.
13. See id.
14. Id.
1998]
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While the contract could not have been more explicit, artistic
temperament and acquisitiveness, being what they are, Mademoi-
selle. Wagner then signed with a competitor, F. Gye, to sing at the
Royal Italian Opera, Covent Garden for more money. 15 The plain-
tiff subsequently brought suit to prevent Wagner from performing
at the Royal Italian Opera, Covent Garden or anywhere else without
Lumley's permission. 16
Wagner's counsel argued that this agreement was a personal
contract and that the awarding of damages would provide adequate
relief.17 In support of this principle, the plaintiff cited several cases,
one of which the Lord Chancellor distinguished as containing no
negative covenant.18 Wagner also argued that "this Court never in-
terferes to restrain the breach of the negative part of a contract in
any case where it cannot specifically enforce the performance of
the positive part of the contract;" for example, preventing the court
from doing through a back door what it could not do through the
front. 19 The Lord Chancellor again distinguished plaintiffs au-
thorities, and went further, respectfully but firmly disagreeing with
the inconsistent rulings. 20 The Lord Chancellor noted the public
policy concern against breaching a contractual obligation and
chided would-be defendants that the court "will not suffer them to
depart from their contracts at their pleasure, leaving the party with
whom they have contracted to the mere chance of any damages
15. See id.
16. See Lumley, 42 Eng. Rep. at 689.
17. See id. Counsel for Wagner argued that:
[T] he agreement [was] a purely personal contract, for the infraction of
which damages are a complete and ample remedy: the agreement is, in
fact, nothing more than a contract of hiring and service, and whatever
the relation between the employer and employed may be, whether master
of servant, or principal and agent, or manager and actor, this Court will,
in all such cases, abstain from interfering, either directly or indirectly ....
Id. (citations omitted).
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. See Lumley, 42 Eng. Rep. at 689-90. The court concluded that:
The agreement to sing for the Plaintiff during three months at his thea-
tre, and during that time not to sing for anybody else, is not a correlative
contract, it is in effect one contract; and though beyond all doubt this
Court could not interfere to enforce the specific performance of the
whole of this contract, yet in all sound construction, and according to the
true spirit of the agreement, the engagement to perform for three
months at one theatre must necessarily exclude the right to perform at
the same time at another theatre. It was clearly intended thatJ. Wagner
was to exert her vocal abilities to the utmost to aid the theatre to which
she agreed to attach herself.
Id. at 693.
[Vol. 5: p. 197
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which a jury may give." 2' He also acknowledged the circuitous
route by which the court sought to compel Wagner to sing for
Lumley, calling it justified. 22
B. Aftermath
The doctrinal stance on surreptitiously enforcing a personal
services contract would soon be established in British and American
law beyond cavil. Still, initial resistance to what might be termed
the "Lumley maneuver" may be evidenced by the comments to Re-
statement First of Contracts, Section 380, allowing for the enforce-
ment of the negative covenant. 23 In what must have been a thinly
veiled allusion to the aftermath of Wagner's operatic battle, the
American Law Institute (ALI) added: "The defendant may persist in
refusing to perform affirmatively, while strictly obeying the injunc-
tive order. In such case the purpose of inducing performance is
not attained; but no contempt and no supervision or testing of per-
formance is necessary."24 Mlle. Wagner thwarted the intention of
the court by declining to sing for her adversary.25
The ALI also paid tribute to the practical problems that could
still survive this ruse.26 In recognition of these surviving difficulties,
21. Id.
22. See id. The Lord Chancellor specifically wrote:
It was objected that the operation of the injunction in the present case
was mischievous, excluding the DefendantJ. Wagner from performing at
any other theatre while this Court had no power to compel her to per-
form at Her Majesty's Theatre. It is true that I have not the means of
compelling her to sing, but she has no cause of complaint if I compel her
to abstain from the commission of an act which she has bound herself not
to do, and thus possibly cause her to fulfil her engagement .... I shall
leave nothing unsatisfied by the judgment I pronounce. The effect, too,
of the injunction in restrainingJ. Wagner from singing elsewhere may, in
the event of an action being brought against her by the Plaintiff, prevent
any such amount of vindictive damages being given against her as a jury
might probably be inclined to give if she had carried her talents and exer-
cised them at the rival theatre: the injunction may also, as I have said,
tend to the fulfillment of her engagement; though, in continuing the
injunction, I disclaim doing indirectly what I cannot do directly.
Id.
23. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 380 cmt. f (1982). Comment f
to Subsection one provides in part:
If the real purpose of enforcement of the negative duty is the indirect
enforcement of an accompanying affirmative promise, the difficulties
that are involved in supervising and testing the promised performance
are not completely avoided by the fact that the decree is in form an in-
junction against breach of the negative duty only.
Id.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See id. Comment f provides the following:
1998]
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the ALI in Comment f suggests courts should employ a type of fore-
sight and resist the temptation to grant the equitable relief in those
situations. 27 "If indirect enforcement by negative decree is likely to
fail of its purpose substantially and damages are adequate compen-
sation for harm caused by breach of the purely negative duties, the
basis for an injunction becomes comparatively slight."28
Subsection two of Section 380 provides the situations where a
personal service contract will not be enforced indirectly through an
injunction.2 9 The ALI also seems to be eschewing the Lumley
sleight-of-hand, an impression bolstered by Comment h.30 While
the ALI did not condemn all such devices, it argued for caution in
their usage. 31 The ALI, however, even in illustrating this rule, did
not challenge the propriety of the Lumley doctrine on its own
facts.3 2
On the other hand, the injunction may be effective in inducing an incom-
plete or defective performance. Again, there is no contempt; but the
court must then test the performance and determine the extent of the
defects in case the plaintiff asks damages for his harm or the defendant
asks compensation for his performance.
RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CoNTRAcrs § 380 cmt. f (1982).
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See id. Section 380(2) specifically says:
A contract to render personal service exclusively for one employer will
not be indirectly enforced by injunction against serving another . . . if
• . .(b) performance of the contract will involve personal relations the
enforced continuance of which is undesirable .. .or (c) the injunction
will leave the employee without other reasonable means of making a liv-
ing; or (d) the service is not unique or extraordinary in character.
Id.
30. See RESTATEMENT (FrsT) OF CoNTRAcTs § 380 cmt. h (1982). Section 380
Comment h states:
An injunction to enforce even the negative duty will generally be refused
if its effect is substantially to prevent the employee from making a living
in his accustomed vocation, the single alternative being the perpetuation
of undesirable relations with an employer or other persons with whom he
is in serious conflict. This would come near to the creation of an involun-
tary servitude.
Id.
31. See id. Comment h also provides:
To justify the granting of an injunction, it should appear that the em-
ployer is ready and willing to continue the employment in good faith and
that the employee is not substantially forced back into the old employ.
Here again is a case for the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Among
the matters to be given special consideration are the character of the ser-
vice to be rendered, the probability of renewal of good relations, the de-
gree of inadequacy of other remedies, and the hardship involved in the
enforcement by injunction.
Id.
32. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 380(2) illus. 6 (1982). Illustra-
tion 6 to Subsection (2) posits the following familiar example:
[Vol. 5: p. 197
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C. Public Policy Concerns After Lumley 3
In subsequent analysis of the Lumley doctrine in both the sports
and entertainment law contexts, various public policy concerns
have been raised as support for enforcement of the rather cunning
backdoor approach. These concerns include such realities as the
relatively short earning period of top athletes, a lesser considera-
tion for performing artists, the desire to let the ruthless market-
place determine an athlete's or entertainer's value, and the
presumed benefit to sports fandom when athletes' freedom of mo-
bility generates tougher, more rigorous team competition. As will
be discussed below, judges have also expressed contrary public pol-
icy concerns, most notably favoring a method of punishment most
likely to deter artists and athletes from breaching contracts and
avoiding professional responsibilities.
D. Lumley's Application in Sports Law Cases
Lumley has a long and cherished toehold in the forum of cases
involving athletes attempting the not-yet Olympic sport of "contract
jumping."34 In these cases, an athlete already under contract with
Team A, signs with Team B for services to be rendered at the same
time the athlete is to be playing for Team A. This "contract jump-
ing" usually arose during periods in which new leagues were being
formed and were liberally stealing from teams in the preexisting
leagues. More often than not, the player attempted to 'jump" back
to his original Team A for an improved salary. The lawsuits were
for breach of contract brought by Team B against the athlete and
interference with contract brought by Team B against Team A. The
granting of injunctive relief in these double-jump cases inevitably
called into question the "clean hands" of plaintiff Team B, which
had arguably induced the athlete to breach the contract with Team
A.
A contracts to employ B, a noted opera singer, the latter promising to
sing in A's theater and not to sing at any competing theater for a speci-
fied period. In breach of this contract, B contracts to sing in C's compet-
ing theater. B's singing there will cause harm to A for which damages are
not an adequate remedy. B can easily make a good income singing in
theaters not in competition with A's theater. A can get an injunction
preventing B from singing in the other theater, although he cannot get
an affirmative decree that B shall sing in A's theater.
Id.
33. See discussion infra Part II.C.
34. See, e.g., Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 872 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(listing cases addressing legal problems generated by contract jumping in baseball,
football and basketball).
1998] 203
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Whichever team lost the services of this perfidious athlete,
however, invariably sued for injunctive relief, asking the court to
enjoin the athlete from playing for the other team. The grounds
were multifold. First, assuming breach was established, the team
would argue that a remedy at law, in the form of money damages,
was inadequate. Second, the team would then argue that the loss of
the player to the team was incalculable, an argument the team
would no doubt forget in subsequent negotiations with that player's
agent. Third, the team would also say that it was impossible to attri-
bute a dollar amount to the ineffable role played by one member of
a team and that the player himself contributed inestimably to the
revenues generated by the club. Given the fact that suits were un-
likely to be brought over a player of modest abilities, courts would
be put in the almost burlesque predicament of comparing the
player's witnesses who demeaned their friend's abilities, on the one
hand, with the club's witnesses, who ascribed godlike attributes to
the traitorous player being sued by that club.
The obstacle of showing that an athlete's uniqueness warrants
injunctive relief is the focus of this article and will be discussed
more fully below. Once this obstacle has been met, the plaintiff
team still must rest its breach of contract claim on something other
than an affirmative promise to perform personal services, if the
plaintiff team is seeking injunctive relief. If the contract contains
an express negative covenant, the court will likely move on to the
next step of its analysis. Even if such a covenant is lacking, courts
have tended to find such a clause implicit, using the reasoning that
a promise to do a task of this nature for one employer usually im-
plied the promise not to do the task for another.35 Courts will still
inquire to determine if the prohibition will be reasonable, limited
in duration (generally not a problem with standard players' con-
tracts for team sports) and geographical scope (also not a problem
if the teams are competitors in the same marketplace) .36 Both re-
quirements will face heightened scrutiny for individual sport ath-
letes, such as golfers, bowlers, and boxers. 37
Courts will also be likely to entertain challenges as to other
restrictive covenants in the contract which might operate to the
35. See, e.g., Madison Square Garden Boxing, Inc. v. Shavers, 434 F. Supp. 449,
450, 452 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); American Ass'n Baseball Club v. Pickett, 8 Pa. C.
232 (C.P. 1890).
36. See, e.g., Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 51 A. 973 (Pa. 1902).
37. See, e.g., Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 926-27
(3d Cir. 1937) (refusing to find that time limits in earlier contract carry over to
superseding contract).
[Vol. 5: p. 197
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player's detriment. Although the "involuntary servitude" argument
was effectively put to rest by the Supreme Court in Flood v. Kuhn,3 8
courts have persisted in examining the player's contract in search
of other illegalities or unconscionability, such as antitrust viola-
tions39 or mutuality of obligation or remedy problems. A case-by-
case analysis of the Lumley progeny in sports law will serve to
demonstrate the consistency with which its rule has been applied,
notwithstanding the evolution of companion bodies of law, includ-
ing the two that most strikingly affected that body of law, antitrust
law and labor law.
1. The Unique and Irreplaceable Athlete
In one of the earliest cases to apply Lumley to the context of
sports, American League Baseball Club v. Chase,40 a New York court
made what was to become the customary recitation of testimony
extolling the athlete's abilities. In this instance, the Chase court
stated that the athlete was "the foremost first baseman in profes-
sional baseball."41 The court noted that the Lumley rule, requiring
the employee's abilities to be "unique and individual" for injunctive
relief to lie, "has been frequently applied to actors, or stars in the
theatrical profession, of special and attractive talents. '42 After hav-
ing satisfied itself as to the unique nature of the player's abilities,
the Chase court found the player's agreement to lack mutuality of
consideration and obligation. 43 Next, the court turned to the alle-
gations that the system under which baseball players are tied to
their teams violates antitrust regulations. 44 The court also stated
that a lengthy study revealed "the involuntary character of the servi-
38. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
39. See, e.g., Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Phila-
delphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
40. 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
41. Id. at 8.
42. Id. The court said:
Between an actor of great histrionic ability and a professional baseball
player, of peculiar fitness and skill to fill a particular position, no substan-
tial distinction in applying the rule laid down . . . [in Lumley] can be
made. Each is sought for his particular and peculiar fitness, each per-
forms in public for compensation, and each possesses for the manager a
means of attracting an audience. The refusal of either to perform ac-
cording to contract must result in loss to the manager, which is increased
in cases where such services are rendered to a rival.
Id. at 8. (quoting Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779, 780-81 (Sup.
Ct. 1890)).
43. See id. at 13-14.
44. See Chase, 149 N.Y.S. at 17.
1998]
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tude which is imposed upon players by the strength of the combina-
tion controlling the labor of practically all of the players in the
country."45
In colorful language unlikely to resonate with fans today, the
court went on:
There is no difference in principle between the system of
servitude built up by the operation of this National Agree-
ment, which . . . provides for the purchase, sale, barter,
and exchange of the services of baseball players - skilled
laborers - without their consent, and the system of peon-
age brought into the United States from Mexico and
thereafter existing for a time within the territory of New
Mexico. 46
The seminal case applying the Lumley rule to sports law con-
tracts is Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie,47 in which a court was
confronted with the issue of whether an athlete can be compelled
to fulfill his affirmative promise not to play for another team during
the term of the contract. 48 The case implemented the Lumley rule
in enforcing the negative covenant barring Lajoie from playing for
another team during the contract term. 49 The court opinion con-
tains an elaborate examination of the methodology for ascertaining
whether damages at law would be adequate. 50 It is this portion of
the opinion that is so frequently cited by subsequent courts at-
tempting to make a similar determination.5 '
In Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett,52 the Ohio Court
of Common Pleas granted injunctive relief, agreeing with the plain-
tiff that Barnett "is a professional basketball player of great skill and
whose talents and abilities as a basketball player are of special,
unique, unusual and extraordinary character."53 The Barnett court
quoted and considered contradictory testimony as to Barnett's
skills, even Barnett's own testimony that he does not have "excep-
45. Id. at 19.
46. Id.
47. 51 A. 973 (Pa. 1902).
48. See id. at 973.
49. See id. at 975.
50. See id. at 973-75.
51. See, e.g., Alabama Binder & Chem. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem.
Corp., 189 A.2d 180, 184 (Pa. 1963); Stuart v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 131 A. 728, 730
(Pa. 1926); T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 492 A.2d 776,
781 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
52. 181 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
53. Id. at 513.
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tional and unique skill and ability" and that his services are not "of a
special, unusual and extraordinary character.
5 4
It is perhaps this portion of the court's analysis which, more
than any other, highlights the absurd and ludicrous nature of a fac-
tual inquiry as to an individual player's meeting this equitable rem-
edy requirement. The athlete, in order to free himself from his
preexisting contractual obligation, must assert and support to the
trial court that he is, at best, of average or even subpar ability,
hardly superior to other players, and that his loss will not cause his
preexisting contractual team incalculable damage. The terminol-
ogy has changed throughout the years, from "unique" to "not read-
ily replaceable," but the concept has remained the same: I, as an
athlete, am not possessed of any skills so valuable that my old team
would not easily be able to replace me. Barnett had to admit he was
inferior to another player, an admission unlikely from a profes-
sional athlete under other circumstances. The Barnett court found
that "[w]hether Barnett ranks with the top basketball players or
not, . . . he is an outstanding professional basketball player of unu-
sual attainments and exceptional skill and ability, and that he is of
peculiar and particular value to plaintiff."55
In Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry,5 6 the Califor-
nia District Court stated that: "Defendants have not shown that the
contract . . . is itself unconscionable, unenforcible [sic] or other-
wise void .... The precedents for granting injunctive relief against
'star' athletes 'jumping' their contracts - and certainly defendants
do not deny that Barry is a unique, a 'star' athlete - are numer-
ous." 57 While one court suggested that the case law now deemed
the requirement of uniqueness or irreplaceability to be "met prima
facie" in any case involving a professional athlete,58 this issue has
not yet reached the point of being removed from dispute at the
trial level.
In Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris,59 the jury specifi-
cally found that James Harris "did not have exceptional and unique
knowledge, skill and ability as a football player."60 Given that this
was contrary to representations expressly contained in Harris' con-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 514.
56. 304 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (N.D. Cal.), affd, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969)
(citations omitted).
57. Id. at 1197.
58. See Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 876 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
59. 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
60. Id. at 42.
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tract, the Cowboys argued that the defendant be estopped from
challenging his uniqueness at trial.61 The court did not accept that
argument, instead considering Harris' contractual stipulation as
mere opinion. 62 On this point, the court cited Coach Tom Lan-
dry's testimony, in which he admitted the stipulation was Harris'
opinion. 63 Still, the appellate court was persuaded that the diction-
ary definition of "unique" was overly narrow and that there was in-
sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of Harris'
mediocrity. 64 "It is true that the witnesses named other professional
football players who are 'equal or better' than Harris as players, but
the testimony was that players of Harris' ability were not available to
the Club. '65
2. Express or Implied Covenants
Courts have demonstrated a willingness to infer a negative cov-
enant where one was not explicitly expressed within a personal serv-
ices contract.66 Particularly in cases involving team athletics, courts
have recognized that a player's promise to play for one team per-
force reflected a prohibition against playing for another.67 "Every
express promise to do an act embraces within its scope an implied
promise not to do anything which will prevent the promissor from
doing the act he has engaged to do."68
This principle may seem less obvious in cases in which an indi-
vidual sport athlete has covenanted to perform for one promoter or
manager or venue.69 When a boxer signs a contract to fight a par-
ticular bout in one arena, does that imply the boxer promises to
refrain from fighting someone else, somewhere else or for some
61. See id. at 43.
62. See id.
63. See id. Coach Landry testified: "Well, I think the boy probably represents
himself as being unique in that respect. Now, maybe he is not the bestjudge of his
ability." Harris, 348 S.W.2d at 43.
Also at trial, Harris was told the dictionary definition of "unique" as "'o]f
which there is but one, or sole, or only.'" Id. Harris was asked, "Do you think you
are the only defensive halfback? A. Not by any means of the imagination. Q. It
says 'Unparalleled, or unequal' - you think you are unparalleled or unequal? A. I
wish I were, now. Q. Do you think you are? A. No, sir, I am not. I know my own
ability." Id.
64. See id. at 44.
65. Id. at 45.
66. See, e.g., American Ass'n Baseball Club v. Pickett, 8 Pa. C. 232 (C.P. 1890).
67. See, e.g., id. at 233.
68. Id. at 232.
69. See, e.g., Madison Square Garden Boxing, Inc. v. Shavers, 434 F. Supp. 449
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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other promoter? Courts have held in the affirmative, owing largely
to the physical risks attached to participating in an intervening
match. In Madison Square Garden Boxing, Inc. v. Shavers,70 a pro-
moter sought to enjoin the heavyweight boxer from participating in
any boxing match until he fulfilled his contractual obligations to
the promoter.71 The court granted the promoter's motion for an
injunction during the contract period because of irreparable injury
to the promoter if the boxer could disavow the agreement.72 The
court held that a non-competition clause was implied in the con-
tract (even if it had not been expressed) to fight for the heavy-
weight championship. 73 Despite the breadth and scope of such an
implied restrictive covenant, the court refused to find it unduly
harsh or one-sided, and held that it would not unreasonably bur-
den the party to be enjoined.74
3. Boilerplate Provisions in Players' Contracts
Moreover, athletes in the major leagues must sign a standard
player contract including a boilerplate provision stipulating that
they possess unique skills or are irreplaceable. While this clause
would seem to parlay itself into a benefit under the contract, the
result is the opposite. The clause is considered evidence that dam-
ages at law would be inadequate if the player breaches the contract,
which is a prerequisite to equitable relief. The existence in stan-
dard players' contracts of boilerplate language in which the player
attests to his uniqueness and irreplaceability is often noted by
courts considering injunctive relief, but in and of itself, these
clauses are not considered controlling. 75
In an early case, Spencer v. Milton,76 a first baseman with the
Albany Black Sox tried to absolve himself from his contract, after
which his team sued to enforce the contract through equitable re-
70. Id.
71. See id. at 449.
72. See id. at 452.
73. See id. at 452 n.11.
74. See Shavers, 434 F. Supp. at 452 n. 11. This view was cited with approval as
being "still represent[ative of] the current state of the law" by the court in Arias v.
Solis, 754 F. Supp. 290, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). See also Matuszak v. Houston Oilers,
Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (denying temporary injunction
because enjoining jumping football player from any "activities related to football"
was too broad).
75. See Arias, 754 F. Supp. at 294 (finding boxer's abilities "unique and ex-
traordinary" by reference to other evidence, not solely by virtue of contractual
stipulation).
76. 287 N.Y.S. 944 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
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lief.7 7 Despite allegations in the complaint that the athlete had
"'particular and special qualifications to play the position of first
base ... [and] special proficiency and wide reputation"' as well as
the affidavit attesting to the fact that defendant's play "'tends to
increase the attendance at games,"' the New York court found
nothing to suggest that a remedy of law would prove inadequate
compensation for the loss. 78
In Boston Professional Hockey Association v. Cheevers,79 the court
applied a stricter test in denying the plaintiffs request for injunc-
tive relief. In Cheevers, despite the fact that two of the team's star
players signed with a rival league, the court did not find irreparable
harm, and therefore granted no injunctive relief.80 Why? The
court willingly noted the players' skills as "outstanding" and "in the
super-star category."81 More significant to the court seemed to be
the plethora of restrictive provisions in the Standard Player's
Contract.8 2
The court also made a detailed inquiry into the impact that the
loss of the players would have on the club's general economic posi-
tion.8 3 The court found the club's revenues had recently increased
and that the financial consequences of these two players leaving,
were at best "unknown."8 4 "[O]n the present record it cannot be
proven that the Bruins will suffer any financial loss whatsoever in
their operating revenues, ticket sales, television incomes, etc., due
to the absence of these two players .... ,,85 The court, however,
found an entirely adequate remedy at law in money damages for
contract breach. 6 It is not clear what impact Cheevers will have on
this area of the law; most later cases have retreated to the more
77. See id. at 944.
78. Id. at 946.
79. 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass.), remanded on other grounds, 472 F.2d 127 (1st
Cir. 1972).
80. See id. at 264, 270.
81. Id. at 263.
82. See id. at 264. For example, clause six of the Standard player's contract
stated:
The Player represents and agrees that he has exceptional and unique
knowledge, skill and ability as a hockey player, the loss of which cannot
be estimated with certainty and cannot be fairly or adequately compen-
sated by damages. The Player therefore agrees that the Club shall have
the right ... to enjoin him by appropriate injunction proceedings from
playing hockey for any other team ....
Id.
83. See Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. at 269.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 269.
86. See id.
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perfunctory analysis of the issue, and even the appellate court
seemed to question this strict test.
4. Harsh/Unconscionable/Lacking Mutuality
Even in light of the resistance to an involuntary servitude argu-
ment, courts will still engage in an inquiry as to the harshness of the
player's plight under the personal services contract.87 While
"harshness" seems a ludicrous concept given the million-dollar
figures bandied about as payment for those personal services,
courts have still weighed the principles underlying freedom of con-
tract with the public policy supporting antitrust legislation. Courts
will nurture and foster freedom of contract, and over the past half-
century have virtually rewritten labor agreements to bring them
into harmony with antitrust policies, but this balancing act will not
always protect breaching athletes. For instance, where a hockey
player voluntarily accepted employment under an allegedly illegal
contract, and he presented an antitrust question only when it ap-
peared to be no longer in his economic interest to comply with his
agreement, the court found the antitrust argument specious as a
justification for breach. 88 The court noted that the claimed illegal-
ity, if any, was divisible from the personal services commitment
made.89
Courts are loathe to achieve through a back door what is le-
gally abhorrent when confronted face to face. Thus, a court is
likely to examine the terms of the contract, including the negative
covenant, to ensure it is neither "unduly harsh" nor "too one-
sided." The contract must not violate requirements of mutuality of
obligation and mutuality of remedy, or risk forfeiting court enforce-
ment of even an explicit and express negative covenant.90
[T]his court has weighed the financial effect that the loss of the services
of these two super-stars would have on the Bruins on the one hand, and
the effect it would have on the two individual players and the intervening
defendant the Blazers, on the other hand. I find that the balance of
hardship favors the defendants, who would suffer a much more serious
hardship if the injunction was granted than the Bruins would suffer by
the denial of the injunctive relief.
Id. at 269-70.
87. Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 877 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
88. See id. at 880-81.
89. See id.
90. See Machen v. Johansson, 174 F. Supp. 522, 527-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The
court stated:
Only in the most unusual case will a court of equity act upon the person
of the defendant to restrain him from doing some act which the plaintiff
claims may cause him irreparable injury. This is particularly true where,
as in this case, the plaintiff seeks to restrain the defendant from freely
19981
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Weegham v. Killefer,91 however, shows that an assertion that a
contract lacks mutuality of remedy may not always be enough to
prevent the enforcement of a negative covenant. Weegham is a case
arising out of the player raids which followed the formation of the
Federal Baseball League in the early 1900s. In Weegham, the Chi-
cago club in the Federal League offered Killefer a contract with a
higher salary after Killefer agreed to play for the Philadelphia Na-
tional League club for the contract period. 92 The Chicago club
therefore had blatantly interfered with an existing relationship, but
it had a substantial defense for its actions: The player had no en-
forceable obligation to his original employer because their contract
lacked mutuality of remedy.93 Still, the court found the Chicago
club undeserving of equitable relief because "Killefer was under a
moral, if not a legal, obligation" to play for Philadelphia.94
Despite the willingness of many courts to provide relief to par-
ties who had contracted with the breaching athlete, most courts
have been fairly tolerant of the athlete's actions. In Detroit Football
Co. v. Robinson,95 the National Football League (NFL) Detroit Lions
were vying, with the American Football League (AFL) Dallas Tex-
ans, for the services of Johnny Robinson. 96 Judge Skelley Wright,
then sitting on the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana, delivered a stern admonition to Robinson:
[I]n four or five, six or eight years, some day your passes
are going to wobble in the air, you are not going to find
that receiver. If you keep playing around here, with these
professionals, and others, and jumping your contracts -
you are all right this time ... but. . . someday your abilities
will be such that [your club] won't even send a twice dis-
barred attorney from Dogpatch to help you. They sent
some dandy ones this time . . .97
practicing his trade. His right to this relief must be clear, reasonable and
well defined.
Id. at 527.
91. 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich.), affd, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir. 1914) (citations
omitted).
92. See id. at 170. The ballplayer continued to play for Philadelphia and the
Chicago club sought an injunction to return him to Chicago and restrain him
from playing for any other team. See id.
93. See id. at 170-71.
94. Id. at 172.
95. 186 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. La.), affid, 283 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1960).
96. See id. at 934.
97. Id. at 935-36. (quoting Chicago Cardinals Football Club, Inc. v. Etcheverry
(D.N.M. filedJune 26, 1956) (unreported opinion)) (alteration in original).
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Despite Judge Skelley Wright's tone, the courts in general have
been tolerant of "contract jumping."98 The reason for this is the
countervailing public policy reasons fostering competition, includ-
ing the interest of the sports fan and the interest of the professional
athlete, who has a limited number of high-earning years. The latter
is substantiated and quantified by the evidence that the formation
of new leagues prompts a general increase in players' salaries, and
the competition-generated salaries more accurately reflect the play-
ers' competitive value.
In deciding whether to provide equitable relief to a party in-
jured by a breaching athlete, courts will not do so blindly, but will
look to the intent of the parties. The plaintiff will have to show the
athlete's arrangement with his employer was intended to be an ex-
clusive one. This is not always as clear or obvious with the individu-
alized sports (tennis, golf, boxing) as with definite-term contracts
involving team sports. Also relevant to a determination of parties'
intent is their agreement with respect to the remedies available in
the event of a breach, as evidenced in Madison Square Garden Corp.
v. Braddock.99 In that case, Braddock, a boxer, had entered into an
agreement with his promoters in which he covenanted that he
would not engage in competing performances for a stated term.100
Within that term, Braddock injured his hand, preventing him from
being able to fight Max Schmeling at the Garden. 101 This agree-
ment was then superseded by another which differed in two re-
spects: First, it did not include a promise of exclusive services; and
second, it added a provision for liquidated damages in the amount
of $5,000.102 Yet a third contract was subsequently entered into,
and under this agreement, Braddock covenanted that he "cannot
participate in any bout with Joe Louis until after June 3, 1937."103
When Braddock later contracted to fight Louis on June 22, 1937,
the Garden alleged that this was an express repudiation. 10 4
Whether the repudiation was express was a technicality the court
considered meaningless because repudiation was clear. 10 5
98. See, e.g., Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 872 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(listing cases addressing legal problems generated by contract jumping in baseball,
football and basketball).
99. 90 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1937).
100. See id. at 925.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Braddock, 90 F.2d at 926.
105. See id. The court said, "[t]here was practical repudiation for the reason
that a heavyweight boxer, through sheer physical limitations, cannot engage in two
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When litigation arose, the employer argued that the court
ought to find that the parties intended that the original negative
covenant would carry over to the second agreement.10 6 This had
some merit since the boxer presumably would understand that the
promoter had an interest in controlling the boxer's exposure in
order to heighten public interest in the planned championship
event. The court found that the parties' agreement, with respect to
the liquidated damages, impliedly negated the possibility of equita-
ble relief, since the parties obviously intended that any breach
could be compensated by money damages. 10 7 Thus the court stated
there was no negative covenant, although it held for Braddock on
other grounds.108 "[Even if] the covenant in question was carried
into the subsequent contracts with legal effect, none the less it
could not be enforced."10 9 The court found the contract deficient
for failing to satisfy the requirement of mutuality of remedy. 110
Judge Buffington, in dissent, quoted Braddock's own words:
'I will not fight again until June, 1936. Then I will stake
my all against the foremost contender under the auspices
of Madison Square Garden. I believe in loyalty .... The
Garden took me off the bread line by giving me three
fights and then to the Baer engagement. Naturally I will
stick to the Garden.'1 1 '
major contests involving the title of World's Heavyweight Champion within
nineteen days." Id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 927.
108. See Braddock, 90 F.2d at 927.
109. Id.
110. Id. The court said:
It is well settled law both in the United States and in England that there
must be mutuality of remedy between parties to a contract before a nega-
tive covenant against one of them will be enforced .... [U]nless a right
be given under the contract whereby the party not in breach may be com-
pelled to perform his obligation, then the party in breach will not be
subjected to injunction under the negative covenant. To do so would be
to subject that party to undue hardship.
Braddock cannot at this time compel the Garden to make use of his serv-
ices as a boxer because the obligations of the Garden to Braddock ex-
pired uponJune 3, 1937, by the terms of his last contract of employment.
There is therefore no mutuality of remedy and therefore this court, even
assuming the existence of a negative covenant, could not as a matter of
law enjoin Braddock from engaging in the contest with Louis upon June
22, 1937, or in any other boxing contest.
Id.
111. Id. at 927-28 (Buffington, J., dissenting).
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To support his view that an injunction was justified, Judge Buffing-
ton went on at some length about the public policy supporting in-
junctive relief.1 12 In order to enforce even express covenants,
courts will stringently evaluate the reasonableness of the restrictive
agreement. The employer will not be imbued with unlimited
power to control the athlete's activities in the event of a breach.
Courts will look to both geographical scope (for example, to ensure
that the two employers are competitors in the same market) and
duration (especially for individual sport athletes).' 1 3
Courts have often found that injunctions cannot be upheld
where the negative covenant lacks a time limit or is overly broad
geographically."14 An additional inquiry arises when the negative
covenant, or covenant not to compete, is so expansive that it bars
certain avenues of performance or athletic activity, subsequent to
the contractual term. An example of an enforceable negative cove-
nant was found in New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University
of Colorado." 5 In this case, an injunction was granted in a "contract
jumping" case that enjoined the coach from activities which com-
peted with the football club and from otherjobs with the University
while he was still under his professional contract. 116
In determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate, courts
are increasingly giving short shrift to the "inadequacy of legal rem-
edy" requirement for equitable relief. The reasons behind such
treatment include the likelihood that it is a star athlete involved in
the litigation, the likelihood that the player's contract included a
stipulation attesting to the player's unique abilities and the unlikeli-
112. See Braddock, 90 F. 2d at 929 (Buffington, J., dissenting).
[I]t is apparent that Braddock contracted for services personal and
unique .. . that apart from all questions of money damage, Braddock is
undermining and lessening the established good will of Garden in de-
stroying its ability to promote worthy sports and manly contests, and that
the destruction of Garden's good will cannot be estimated in money dam-
ages; that Braddock's continuing to be seduced from the path of contract
duty by sordid money making promoters, has made it, and will make it,
impossible for ball players, boxers, artists, authors, singers, and movie
folk and other persons rendering unique and person service, to enlist the
needed aid of helpful promoters, if Braddock's contract is but a scrap of
paper and binds no one but the promoter.
Id. (Buffington, J., dissenting).
113. See, e.g., Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 51 A. 973 (Pa. 1902).
114. See Machen v. Johansson, 174 F. Supp. 522, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Within
Machen, the only temporal limitation identified by the court was language which
stated "until the above agreements have been fulfilled." Id. at 528.
115. 592 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1979).
116. See id. (holding that coach was unable to pursue opportunities at other
university, even if not involving football club).
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hood that a "replacement" athlete could readily fit within the team
unit as easily as the defector team member. 117 Thus, even with a
player who might fall somewhat short of "superstar" status, courts
tend to employ a rebuttable presumption of uniqueness.118 This
situation was the one at issue in the case of Winnipeg Rugby Football
Club v. Freeman." 9 Despite allegations of mediocrity, the Winnipeg
court found the players to satisfy the requirements of uniqueness
and special skills. 120
Boston Celtics Ltd. Partnership v. Shaw is a strong example of a
court spending little time with the "inadequacy of legal remedy"
requirement.12' In Shaw, Brian Shaw, having already signed a five-
year deal with the Celtics, committed to play for an Italian basket-
ball team for two years within the same five-year period.' 22 Shaw
subsequently notified the Celtics he would not rescind the second
year of his Italian contract in order to return to the Celtics.' 23 The
First Circuit found persuasive the contractual representation in
Shaw's contract in which he "represents and agrees that he has ex-
traordinary and unique skill and ability as a basketball player....
and that any breach by the Player of this contract will cause irrepa-
rable injury to the Club."'124 With regard to the occasionally com-
117. See Winnipeg Rugby Football Club v. Freeman, 140 F. Supp. 365, 366-67
(N.D. Ohio 1955).
118. See id.
119. Id. at 366. In this case, the court noted:
[The coach] testified that the two defendants only were 'good' football
players but not specially skilled, although the consideration for their con-
tracts... seemed to me to recognize in them.., rather promising talent
of something more than ordinary skill for a beginner in professional foot-
ball (although they had to make the team to get the consideration called
for by those contracts).
... While it also is a fact that the skill and ability of college football
players ordinarily improves with experience in professional play, never-
theless, it also is recognized that some college players who exhibit special
skill and unique ability in college immediately upon entering profes-
sional play exhibit such skill and outstanding ability ....
... [A] ppraisal of skill and unique ability of a player, as they relate to
contracts of this type, must depend somewhat upon his prospects and
potential. Otherwise, such a contract with a college football player sel-
dom would stand up for the professional club that first signed him.
Id. at 366.
120. See id. at 366-67. But see Connecticut Prof'l Sports Corp. v. Heyman, 276
F. Supp. 618, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (rejecting injunctive relief because of unduly
harsh or one-sided contract terms which would have prevented basketball player
from playing for team in newly organized league).
121. 908 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1990).
122. See id. at 1043-44.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 1048 (alteration in original).
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peting public policies of promoting free competition and
discouraging breach of contract, the court noted the distinction be-
tween ordering a person to perform a personal services contract
and restraining a person from contracting with others to perform
such services.1 25 The court upheld the injunction despite claims of
unclean hands on the part of the Celtics, who had induced him to
rescind with the Italian team during a "weak moment" of
"homesick [ness]."126
5. Timing
Finally, timing is of critical importance with regard to enforce-
ment of the negative covenant. The issue of remedies for "contract
jumping" usually will arise in cases in which the player would begin
performing for another team during the term of the initial con-
tract.127 This has occasionally posed a problem when the duration
of the initial contract is unclear. In Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v.
Ewing,128 the court found the contract's reserve clause to be an in-
valid basis for enjoining the baseball player from signing with an-
other club during the reserve year. 129 Therefore, the player was
free to sign with another club because being under reserve for a
year was merely an agreement to negotiate that year and did not
preclude entering into a contract with another party. 130
E. Lumley's Rule as Embodied by the Restatement Second of
Contracts Section 367 ,
The Restatement Second of Contracts codifies in Section
367(1) and (2) and its appurtenant comments much of the Lumley
doctrine and what was formerly Section 380 of the Restatement
125. See id. at 1049. The First Circuit noted:
Shaw, while conceding that the public also has an interest in seeing that
contracts between consenting adults are honored, points to a general pol-
icy disfavoring enforcement of personal service contracts. That latter pol-
icy, however, typically prevents a court from ordering an individual to
perform a personal service ... ; it does not prevent a court from ordering
an individual to rescind a contract for services and to refrain from per-
forming a service for others.
Shaw, 908 F.2d at 1049 (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 1049.
127. See Cincinnati Bengals v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 139-40 (S.D. Ohio
1974) (denying injunctive relief against contract to take effect after defendant's
current contract expires).
128. 42 F. 198 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890).
129. See id. at 205 (holding that although reserved for one team, refusal to
negotiate with that team did not constitute enforceable breach).
130. See Ewing, 42 F. at 204.
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First. Section 367(1) provides "[a] promise to render personal serv-
ices will not be specifically enforced."'131 Subsection (2), which ad-
dresses the "mischievous" aspect of Lumley, 132 prevents enforcement
of a contract to render personal service if the enforcement would
be unreasonable or would deprive the individual of an income. 133
Thus, while Section 367 acknowledges the backdoor method of
enforcing the negative covenant, it prohibits such enforcement in
situations where "the enforced continuance . . . is undesirable or
will.. . leave the employee without other reasonable means of mak-
ing a living."' 34 Section 367, therefore, neither retreats nor ad-
vances from its position under its predecessor Section 380. The
comments to Section 367 suggest that, in addition to the discomfort
with the concept of "involuntary servitude," 135 there are concerns
with compelling personal service 136 and the "difficulty of enforce-
ment inherent in passing judgment on the quality of
performance."137
Illustration 1 posits a scenario based on De Rivafinoli v. Cor-
setti,'13 with a different outcome under the Restatement (and, nota-
bly, an outcome and perspective at odds with the grudging homage
to Lumley in Section 380's Illustration 6 to Subsection 2 discussed
above). Within the illustration, specific performance was denied
the owner of an opera house when an opera singer repudiated the
contract to appear elsewhere.' 3 9 Under this set of circumstances,
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981).
132. Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 693 (Ch. 1852). For a discussion of
Lumley, see supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(2) (1981).
134. Id.
135. Id. § 367 cmt. a (1981); see also id. § 365.
136. See id. § 367 cmt. a.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 cmt. a (1981); See also id.
§ 367 cmt. b. Comment b explains:
The importance of trust and confidence in the relation between the par-
ties, the difficulty ofjudging the quality of performance rendered and the
length of time required for performance are significant factors. Among
the parties that have been held to render . . . personal services . . . are
actors, singers and athletes ....
Id.
138. De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige Ch. 264 (N.Y. Ch. 1833).
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 cmt. b, illus. 1 (1981).
The illustration presented in the Restatement is as follows:
A, a noted opera singer, contracts with B to sing exclusively at B's opera
house during the coming season. A repudiates the contract before the
time for performance in order to sing at C's competing opera house, and
B sues A for specific performance. Even though A's singing at C's opera
house will cause B great loss that he cannot prove with reasonable cer-
tainty, and even though A can find suitable jobs singing at opera houses
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the Restatement makes no allowance for an express or implied neg-
ative covenant. Comment c to the same section provides for that
contingency in noting that "[a] contract for personal service is usu-
ally exclusive in the sense that it imposes not only a duty to render
the service to the other party but also a duty to forbear from render-
ing it to anyone else."1 40 The American Law Institute stipulates
that, given the public policy and enforcement difficulties noted in
Subsection (1), granting injunctive relief based on that "duty to for-
bear" is especially problematic.14 1 Section 367, Comment c, con-
templates the notion that damages would suffice except when the
employee's services are "unique" or "extraordinary" due to skills or
knowledge the employee possesses. 142 Further, even if this stan-
dard is satisfied, the court will not enforce that duty to forbear if it
denies the employee the means to make a living. 143 Therefore,
Comment c disavows the backdoor method employed by Lumley,
clearly denying use of an injunction to compel performance. 144
The ALI does make allowance for those occasions when an in-
junction to forbear would not compel performance. In such situa-
tions, the ALI urges that, "if the probable result of an injunction
will be the employee's performance of the contract, it should ap-
pear that the employer is prepared to continue the employment in
good faith so that performance will not involve personal relations
the enforced continuance of which is undesirable.' 45 To assist in
such a determination, Comment c suggests as relevant considera-
tions "the character and duration of the service, the probability of
the renewal of good relations, the extent to which other remedies
are adequate, and the probable hardship that will result from an
injunction."'146 Illustration 4, based on, inter alia, Lumley's facts, hy-
not in competition with B's, specific performance will be refused (emphasis
added).
Id.
140. Id. § 367 cmt. c.
141. See id.
142. Id. The American Law Institute states:
Damages are likely to be adequate to protect the employer's interest
[thereby precluding injunctive relief] unless the employee's services are unique
or extraordinary, either because of special skill that he possesses or because of
special knowledge that he has acquired of the employer's business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367, cmt. c (1981) (emphasis added).
143. See id.
144. See id. (stating that "[i]t is not the purpose in granting the injunction to
enforce the duty to render the service and, to justify granting it, it should appear
that the employee is not being forced to perform the contract as the only reason-
able means of making a living.").
145. Id.
146. Id.
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pothesizes that, if the owner of the opera house was not in direct
competition with the individual who has now contracted with the
singer, the injunction would not be granted because it would force
the singer to remain in the employ of the opera house against the
singer's desire. 147 Thus, even under the Restatement's articulated
concern with public policy and its disavowal of Lumley's backdoor
machinations, courts may achieve by enforcement of negative cove-
nants what they could not under the affirmative covenant, as long
as the negative prohibition is reasonable in scope and duration
(that is, the scope must be limited to competitors in the same
marketplace).
III. THE LUMLEYDOCTRINE IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW
While the so-called Lumley doctrine in the entertainment con-
text runs almost parallel to the doctrine as it evolved in the sports
law setting, it bears reminding that Lumley itself was a doctrine cre-
ated in an entertainment case, almost literally involving an em-
ployer's attempt to compel a "caged bird" to sing. Thus, such
parallelism will be apparent with issues such as avoidance of invol-
untary service, the implication of negative covenants where affirma-
tive ones are express, the possible lack of mutuality as preventing
enforcement, the scrutiny of overly harsh or oppressive provisions
prerequisite to enforcement, the requirement for reasonableness in
scope and duration of the negative covenant, the effect of noncom-
petitive clauses during or subsequent to the contractual period and
the standard to be used in determining money damages. Also, one
must consider whether, in an endeavor by definition artistic rather
than economic, adequacy of performance could ever be quantified.
When one considers how the Restatements First and Second ad-
dressed the conundrum of judicial compulsion in an arena requir-
ing personal supervision, one wonders whether the ALl could ever
envision a circumstance in which an artist's performance could ever
be gauged as compliant. There is no case law confronting the situa-
tion in which a recalcitrant artist abjures breach, yet engages in a
campaign to diminish the performance to express disaffection with
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 cmt. c, illus. 4 (1981). The
illustration is provided below:
The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 1, B sues A for an in-
junction ordering A not to sing in C's opera house. The injunction may
properly be granted. If, however, C is not a competitor of B, the injunc-
tion will not be granted because its principal effect would be indirectly to
compel A to continue in B's service.
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the employer. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that this is
occasionally offered as an excuse for an uncharacteristically flawed
performance by an artist disgruntled with a record company or a
film or play director.1 48 One is somewhat compelled to presume
that ego, or pride of authorship, would ordinarily motivate even the
most resentful of artists to give the best performance despite profes-
sional strife.
IV. ENTERTAINMENT LAW CoNTRAcTS CASES
In Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Rath,149 in which defendants per-
formed acrobatics for plaintiff producer, the court engaged in a
lengthy analysis of the nature of defendants' abilities.1 50 Utilizing
the standard of "extraordinary, unique and cannot be replaced,"
the court relied on Lumley, as well as McCaull v. Braham,151 in which
Lillian Russell's performance of comic opera, at a theatre other
than the one with whom she had initially contracted, was enjoined
through enforcement of an express negative covenant. 152 The
court in McCaull reiterated the belief that contracts for personal
services may be of such a nature as to preclude damages as a just
remedy and to warrant specific performance.153
148. See cases cited supra note 174.
149. 271 F. 827 (2d Cir. 1921).
150. See id. at 829-30. The court described the acrobats abilities, stating:
The testimony shows that their feats are unique and extraordinary. A
prominent theatrical manager and producer . . . testified. One of the
feats of the defendants' performances ... is that one of the defendants
with one hand raises the other defendant, a full-grown man, from the
floor, his body being stretched at full length upon the floor. The witness
... said this was done without apparent effort, just as easy as you would
lift a straw.' . . .[H]e declared 'It is a fact that it is the most marvelous
thing that has ever been before.' [The witness] added that it had never
before been done with a grown-up man in the history of this country.
Id.
151. 16 F. 37 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
152. See id. at 38.
153. Shubert, 271 F. at 831 (quoting McCaull 16 F. at 40). The McCaull court
stated:
Contracts for the services of artists or authors of special merit are per-
sonal and peculiar; and when they contain negative covenants which are
essential parts of the agreement, as in this case, that the artists will not
perform elsewhere, and the damages ... are incapable of definite mea-
surement, they are such as ought to be observed in good faith and specifi-
cally enforced in equity.
Id. (quoting McCaull 16 F. at 40).
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The court also cited to the sports law cases of Cincinnati Exhibi-
tion Co. v. Marsans,15 4 and Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie.1 55 In
addition, the court cited Pomeroy on Specific Performance which,
although precluding affirmative specific performance, enforced the
breach of negative covenants involving special skills, knowledge
and/or ability through an injunction. 156
In dismissing the damages remedy, the court concentrated on
the difficulty of ascertaining damages and the inability of the pro-
ducer to secure a replacement contract.1 57 The court noted the
frequent application of such a policy when the individual con-
tracting has an established reputation and their contract prohibits
engagement elsewhere. 158
The Shubert court went on to address the underlying policy and
practicality problems leading to this doctrine. A court of equity will
not enforce an affirmative covenant for personal services because
there is no efficient way to compel performance, for example, to
make a singer sing up to par. They can, however, efficiently pre-
vent breach through the issuance of an injunction. 159 The court
154. 216 F. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1914) (holding that ten days notice requirement
before defendant ballplayer could be terminated did not defeat requirement of
mutuality).
155. 51 A. 973 (Pa. 1902). For a discussion of Lajoie, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 47-50.
156. Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Rath, 271 F. 827, 831 (2d Cir. 1921) (quoting
Pomeroy on Specific Performance, page 31). The language reiterated by the Shubert
court stated:
Where one person agrees to render personal services to another, which
require and presuppose a special knowledge, skill and ability in the em-
ployee, so that in case of a default the same service could not easily be
obtained from others, although the affirmative specific performance of
the contract is beyond the power of the court, its performance will be
negatively enforced by enjoining its breach.
Id.
157. See id. at 831. The court noted that the determining criterion was the
fact that the damages "cannot be estimated with any certainty, and the employer
cannot by means of any damages purchase the same services from others." Id.
158. See id. at 832 (quoting 5 POMEROv'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 289
(1918)). The court noted:
The most frequent application has been in cases of actors and actresses of
established reputation. Contracts for their services often stipulate that
they shall not perform elsewhere during their engagement with a particu-
lar manager. Their services being extraordinary and special, an injunc-
tion is generally granted against the breach of such a stipulation. It will
likewise be granted when an artist agrees to work for the complainant
and for no one else.
Shubert, 271 F. at 832.
159. See id. The court explained their inability to compel action under an
affirmative covenant:
[T]hey cannot in any direct manner compel an actor to act or a singer to
sing. But... courts... may restrain by injunction the breach of a nega-
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sidestepped the issue of whether the negative covenant need be ex-
press, as it was in that case. 160
The process of weighing a performer's artistic cache is no-
where treated with as much gravity as in Harry Hastings Attractions v.
Howard,16 1 in which the breach of contract by the defendant come-
dian was enjoined through enforcement of a negative covenant.
The comedian was praised by several newspapers and he himself
admitted in the contract "... that his services were unique, special
and extraordinary."1 62 The court did not find that wholly control-
ling because whether his services were unique and extraordinary
was a matter of law. 163 The court then engaged in a straight-faced
examination of the defendant's reviews by critics of defendant's
performances in burlesque acts across the country, which they
deemed the best determinant of his actual placement in that
class. 164
The Second Circuit in 1922, in Winter Garden Co. v. Smith,165
addressed a case in which a contract specified that the artists, a bur-
lesque comedy group, were rendering services which were "unique
and extraordinary" and that they could not be replaced.1 66 The
Winter Garden court engaged in a somewhat derisive assessment of
tive covenant by which an actor or a singer of unusual gifts has agreed not
to act or not to sing in a specified period, except under the management
of the other party to the contract.
Id.
160. See id. at 827.
161. 196 N.Y.S. 228 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
162. Id. at 230.
163. See id. at 230-31. The court stated that "the question whether his services
are unique, special and extraordinary must be determined by the court as one of
law .... It cannot be determined by the particular calling, but by the personality
exhibited in the conduct of one's work." Id.
164. See id. ("I know of no better way to determine whether this defendant
falls within the class mentioned than by a perusal of the critiques of persons in his
calling."). Citing papers filed in the comedian's defense, the court concluded that
"[i] t is hardly consistent to say that a burlesque comedian was so adept as to be the
principal character in a Broadway burlesque show, and at the same time to say that
he is of ordinary ability and in a class with many other mediocre actors." Howard,
196 N.Y.S. at 233.
165. 282 F. 166 (2d Cir. 1922).
166. Id. at 167. The contract specified that the performers:
[N]ow admit that [they] are ... artist[s] of magnitude sufficient to carry
one of the leading parts in the Winter Garden attractions, or any other
attraction, and that no one can be engaged to replace you in your partic-
ular line in the event of your refusal to perform. You agree, therefore,
that the salary herein required to be paid you is being paid because of
your exceptional talents, and because such services are unique and
extraordinary.
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defendants' talents as it applied the "unique and extraordinary"
standard, referring to their act as a sort of "low comedy order."1 67
The defendants' manager was cited as an authority on the skills of
his client.168 He listed their talents as the ability to do "grotesque
gymnastics," singing and dancing. 169 The court then reasoned
from the manager's testimony concerning the high salary they re-
ceived that the defendants must have had the ability to draw quite a
crowd.170
In poetic review of the meaning of "unique and extraordinary,"
the court rhapsodized in terms appropriate to the vagaries of evalu-
ating artistic talent. The court referred to the "personality" of the
performer, including the ability to use "gesture, expression,
method of speech rendition, [and] a keen understanding of what
provokes amusement" to be successful.'71 The court continued, in
less romanticized language, by comparing analogous precedent,
such as Hammerstein v. Mann172 and Shubert v. Angeles.173
167. Id. at 170. The court stated, "The so-called acting of defendants was of
the clean low comedy order, affording amusement to that part of the public which
regards such performances as entertaining and recreative." Id.
168. See Winter Garden Co., 282 F. at 170 ("No one was better qualified to de-
scribe defendants than Hart, who had been their manager for 14 years.").
169. Id. The defendants' manager testified, "They are very talented, because
they could do all kinds of entertainment; outside of being comedians, they had the
ability of doing grotesque gymnastics, which very few comedians could do; besides,
they were very capable dancers and singers." Id.
170. See id. Noting the manager's testimony that the defendants were paid
"the highest salary of which he knew for a quartette [sic] of this kind," the court
reasoned that "so large a compensation would not be paid ... unless these defend-
ants had that kind of ability which draws audiences, and hence makes their em-
ployment commercially valuable." Id.
171. Winter Garden Co., 282 F. at 170. The court stated:
We hardly need expert testimony to inform us that what one of the wit-
nesses called "personality" is what counts. One performer can speak or
act a line of a play, which to a layman would be dull or meaningless in
cold print, in such manner as to provoke laughter or tears, while another
would call forth no emotion. Gesture, expression, method of speech ren-
dition, keen understanding of what provokes amusement, are all part of
those accomplishments which make one man a successful comedian and
another a failure. When, therefore, actors such as these have been suc-
cessful for many years because of individual characteristics, and com-
mand salaries of a size rarely known in the liberal arts and sciences, their
peculiar ability in the field in which they perform is almost res ipsa
loquitur.
Id.
172. See id. (quoting Hammerstein v. Mann, 122 N.Y.S. 276 (App. Div.
1910) (holding singer of stock parts at moderate salary not unique)).
173. See id. (quoting Shubert v. Angeles, 80 N.Y.S. 146 (App. Div. 1903) (hold-
ing defendant with "special talent as a mimic" was unique)).
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The heart of this taboo against enforcing an affirmative cove-
nant may be said to be twofold: abhorrence to involuntary servi-
tude, particularly in light of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, and the more pragmatic discomfort with trying to
quantify an artistic endeavor. While the first dilemma is of con-
science, the second is entirely practical. In sports, it is difficult to
affix a dollar amount to an athlete's contribution to his team. In
entertainment law, the difficulty - - not incomparable to that in
sports - - lies in determining when performance satisfying the con-
tractual obligation is met. Did the athlete play to par? Did the
singer perform with her customary flair and distinction? 174
In Associated Newspapers v. Phillips,175 the "artist" in question was
a writer of feature articles for the New York Globe, a daily newspaper,
who wished to circulate his articles in additional territories. 176 The
standard articulated by the Second Circuit in this case was that an
injunction could be issued if the services were "unique, and cannot
readily be obtained from others."'177 The Phillips court cited to Shu-
bert Theatrical Co. v. Gallagher,'78 for the proposition that an injunc-
tion is the proper remedy when the actor's services are unique. 179
In a typically lengthy analysis of defendant's talents, the Second Cir-
cuit referred to the testimony of newspaper editors, who found de-
174. American Broad. Cos. v. Wolf, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485 n.4 (N.Y. 1981); De
Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige Ch. 264, 270 (N.Y. Ch. 1833); see also Christopher T.
Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment Of Employees, 46 STAN. L. REv. 87 (1993).
In Wolf, the court, quoting De Rivafinoli, stated:
I am not aware that any officer of this court has that perfect knowledge of
the Italian language, or possesses that exquisite sensibility in the auricular
nerve which is necessary to understand, and to enjoy with a proper zest,
the peculiar beauties of the Italian opera, so fascinating to the fashiona-
ble world. There might be some difficulty, therefore, even if the defend-
ant was compelled to sing under the direction and in the presence of a
master in chancery, in ascertaining whether he performed his engage-
ment according to its spirit and intent. It would also be very difficult for
the master to determine what effect coercion might produce upon the
defendant's singing, especially in the livelier airs; although the fear of
imprisonment would unquestionably deepen his seriousness in the graver
parts of the drama. But one thing at least is certain; his songs will be
neither comic, or even semi-serious, while he remains confined in that
dismal cage, the debtor's prison of New York.
Wolf, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 485 n.4 (quoting De Rivafinoli, 4 Paige Ch. at 270).
175. 294 F. 845 (2d Cir. 1923).
176. See id. at 847-48.
177. Id. at 850.
178. 201 N.Y.S. 577 (App. Div. 1923).
179. See Phillips, 294 F. at 850 (citing Gallagher, 201 N.Y.S. at 580). The court
stated that, "when an actor's services are of a special, unique, and unusual quality,
he may be enjoined from violating his contract of service by performing for others
than the one with whom he had previously engaged." Id. at 850.
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fendant's work to be "of distinctive character," and that "it would be
difficult, if not impossible.., to replace."1 8 0 One editor went on to
say that he knew "of no newspaper writer whose work resembles his,
nor do I know of any such who could duplicate his work, or provide
a substitute for it."181 Other "experts" in journalism also praised
defendant's work as unusual and extraordinary.1 8 2
The court rejected Phillips' efforts at undermining the credi-
bility of these witnesses by arguing that these newspapermen made
little use of Phillips' supposedly extraordinary pieces. In this sense,
at least, we see a glimpse of logic in the outraged writer bitterly
quarreling with those who would praise him for his gifts.
The defendants in Gallagher were vaudevillians, and the appel-
late division acknowledged that in determining "whether the de-
fendants' services are of that special, unique, and unusual quality
which renders them liable to be enjoined,"18 3 recourse must be
made to expert opinion. It found that even when there is a differ-
ence in opinion as to the uniqueness of the defendants' perform-
ance, the testimony of some experienced in that area as to the
uniqueness and special character of their performance is usually
sufficient to render their replacement impossible.1 8 4
Even the performers' witnesses, according to the court, at-
tested to the success defendants had enjoyed, noting that defend-
ants had been "headliners" in the local circuit; that their names had
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id at 851. The "experts" described the work of the defendant as:
[E]xceptional . . . unusual and extraordinary .... [B]etter adapted to
being syndicated than that of any other columnist now writing in the
American press, for the reason that he has a general human interest ap-
peal, which is so necessary where syndicated matter is to be published in
all sorts of papers, and go to readers of all kinds and sorts.
Phillips, 294 F. at 851.
183. Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Gallagher, 201 N.Y.S. 577, 580 (App. Div.
1923).
184. See id. at 580-81. The court stated:
[A] s usual in such instances, a conflict of opinion upon the part of those
experienced in stage craft and stage management, as to whether these
defendants are ordinarily vaudeville performers, easily replaceable, and
not at all unique or specially gifted, or whether their presentation with
unusual talent of a peculiar melody by the carrying out of unusual man-
nerisms in the execution of their act, and the ability through unusual
attainments, unique stage business, and attractive personality and powers
of attraction to render themselves of special value to a theatrical com-
pany, make them of that unique and special character which renders
their replacement or substitution almost impossible according to com-
mon standards of endeavor.
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been "'in the top' for years and have had a special meaning to the
theater-going public; that 'big type' had been used for them."1 8 5
The court concluded that the defendants "come within the class
whose services are of such a character that they will be deemed
practically irreplaceable."1 8
6
In its 1990 opinion, in Zink Communications v. Elliott,1 87 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
addressed itself to the skills of Gordon Elliott, the British television
personality.188 The test remained one of "unique services" and "ir-
reparable injury." 18 9 The court referred to the precedents in Winter
Garden and Wolf, and surveyed the differences between cases in
which an injunction was issued and those in which it was denied. 190
In Edwards v. Cissy Fitzgerald,a91 the First Department of the Appel-
late Division in 1910 described the defendant as having "a charm
peculiar to herself. By her grace, beauty and artistic methods she
has become a special attraction." 192 The Edwards court concluded
that "lIt] he plaintiff would undoubtedly find it difficult to procure a
substitute who would be likely to produce a similar impression
upon the public.' 9 3  The Zink court also cited Ziegfield v.
Norworth,194 in which the First Department described the defendant
saying "' [she] was the real star around whom the whole production
of the plaintiff's play centered and she had been heavily featured in
announcements and advertisements so as to give her chief promi-
nence.' "195 In a 1911 circuit court case, Comstock v. Lopokowa,1 96 the
court stated that, while the Russian dancers at issue were "'of a very
high order and possessing unusual personal attractions, . . . [with]
such unusual attainments and personal characteristics and of such
especial value to the complainants"' as to merit enforcement of the
negative covenant, injunctions need not be limited to such in-
stances in which "'the employees should be the stars or the only
185. Id. at 581.
186. Id.
187. No. 90 Civ. 4297 (CSH), 1990 WL 176382 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 1990).
188. See id. at *1.
189. Id. at *17.
190. See id.
191. Id. at *18 (citing Edwards v. Cissy Fitzgerald, in Hammerstein v. Mann,
122 N.Y.S. 276, 278 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910)).
192. Zink Communications, No. 90 Civ. 4297 (CSH), 1990 WL 176382 at *18
(quoting Edwards, 122 N.Y.S. at 278, in Hammerstein, 122 N.Y.S. at 278).
193. Id. (quoting Edwards, in Hammerstein, 122 N.Y.S. at 278).
194. Ziegfield v. Norworth, 118 N.Y.S. 1151 (App. Div. 1909)(mem.).
195. Zink Communications, 1990 WL 176382, at *18 (quoting Ziegfield, 118
N.Y.S. 1151 paraphrased in Hammerstein, 122 N.Y.S. at 278).
196. 190 F. 599 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
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stars of the complainant's performances or that the performances
should be brought to a standstill because of their withdrawal. ' 1,, 97
With the athlete, the concern over a player who has signed a
contract with another team subsequent to the expiration of the ini-
tial contract is that the player may not wish to show up his "new"
team. This is another idiosyncratic quality to the entertainment in-
dustry that distinguishes it from athletics, and that bears upon rem-
edies for breach of contract. Participation in any individual
entertainment project has value to the artist that may be incalcula-
ble and impossible to be remedied by anything other than equita-
ble relief. While it is difficult to imagine an athlete playing for a
reward other than money, artists frequently perform in exchange
for better billing, more creative control, or in exchange for partici-
pation in an unrelated endeavor. Financial compensation is often
not the goal, or not the only goal, of the artist attempting to obtain
a particular role. Compensation is directly linked to issues of crea-
tive control in and credit attribution for the project. The effect of
performing that role may not be known or quantifiable. Billing it-
self is considered to have both a "publicity value" and a "recogni-
tion value", in which credit for one project is regarded cumulatively
with credits for other performances in order to determine an indi-
vidual artist's value. 198 The number of credits is also tallied for pur-
poses of audience regard as well as membership in certain
entertainment unions, such as the Writers' Guild, Directors' Guild
and Actors' Equity.1 99
The concept of "pay or play contracts," in which an artist is
guaranteed payment regardless of whether the artist is permitted to
perform, ignores the interest of the performer in each artistic en-
deavor. It is unique to the nature of entertainment and art that an
artist derives benefit well beyond the immediate economic payoff
from participation in particular projects. 200
Similar balancing of public policy interests has been under-
taken when the contract dispute is in entertainment law cases,
rather than in sports law. In a suit involving the broadcaster
Warner Wolf, New York's highest court noted the "general judicial
disfavor of anticompetitive covenants contained in employment
197. Zink Communications, 1990 WL 176382, at *18 (quoting Lopokowa, 190 F.
at 600-01).
198. THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAw § 10 (2d ed. Supp. 1997).
199. Id.
200. See Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689 (Cal.
1970).
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contracts."20 1 Still, the court remarked that, even when the per-
former's abilities met the criteria of being "special or unique ....
no New York case has been found where enforcement has been
granted, following termination of the employment contract, solely on the
basis of the uniqueness of the services." 20 2 Thus, if an entertain-
ment law contract were analogized to a personal services contract of
an athlete in a non-team sport, we may expect courts to scrutinize
the contract to determine whether it is too harsh, one-sided or un-
duly burdensome. We may similarly expect such scrutiny to focus
on the geographical and temporal scope of the non-compete provi-
sions inherent in implicit or explicit negative covenants. The geo-
graphical scope in entertainment law may include an analysis for
each individual medium, a difficult task given the amorphous na-
ture of media in the cybernetic age.
In American Broadcasting Cos. v. Wolf,203 the focus at both the
New York Appellate Division and the highest court of New York was
whether the negative covenant was enforceable in light of a rigor-
ous scrutiny required. The courts considered the reasonableness of
the anti-competitive covenant, with regard to "time, space or
scope," and whether the covenant "operate [d] in a harsh or oppres-
sive manner."20 4 In Wolf, there was no express covenant in the con-
tract between ABC and sportscaster Warner Wolf.20 5 While the New
York Court of Appeals acknowledged that negative covenants may
sometimes be implied for the period of the contract, post-contract
anti-competitive covenants will not be implied. 20 6 The court re-
viewed the history of judicial reluctance to order specific perform-
ance of a personal services contract, referring to both the practical
difficulties and the distaste for anything smacking of involuntary
servitude. 2 07
Underlying all of these cases is the resilient thread of the in-
quiry as to skill. Regardless of the articulation given this inquiry,
the standard has not varied greatly since Harry Rogers Theatrical En-
terprises v. Comstock,20 8 in which the test was whether the defendant's
services were "unique, special, or extraordinary [rather than] ordi-
201. American Broad. Cos. v. Wolf, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482, 486-87 (N.Y. 1981).
202. Id. at 487 n.6 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
203. 438 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y. 1981).
204. Id. at 486.
205. See id. at 483, 487.
206. See id. at 486.
207. See id. at 485.
208. 232 N.Y.S. 1 (App. Div. 1928).
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nary and . . . easily . . . replaced." 209 In Comstock, the New York
Appellate Division regarded "facts" rather than "opinions" to be
persuasive. 210 Those facts included the express representation in
the contract that Comstock's services were indeed unique and ex-
traordinary. 211 The court found the provision not to be control-
ling, although they compared it with Comstock's later testimony
that his services were not unique.21 2 Other facts included Coin-
stock's relatively large salary ($1000 weekly) which "compares most
favorably with that received by the leaders in the scientific, artistic,
and political world." 213 The Comstock court found the services of
the defendant unique, due to his ability to grasp and maintain the
attention of the audience and the fact that the damage caused by
the breach of such a contract would be irreparable. 214
More recently, as we see in the Warner Wolf case the same test
seems to persist today, despite variations in the language used to
express that inquiry. Whether the legal standard is "no adequate
remedy at law" or "unique and irreplaceable skills," or "not readily
replaceable," the court is still compelled to engage in an evaluation
as to the abilities of the athlete or performer, measuring their abili-
ties by the extent of economic loss which could be expected or by
the kudos bestowed by rival players or performers.
It is perhaps appropriate to close this discussion with a brief
reference to the issue of whether a discharged artist may enjoin
production of the film or play. The Restatement Second of Con-
tracts notes that the extension of its doctrine against enforcement
of affirmative covenants "has sometimes been extended to bar spe-
cific enforcement of the employer's promise where personal super-
vision is considered to be involved."21 5 Thus, it must be considered
whether a performer has a similar weapon to compel being re-
209. Id. at 3.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Comstock, 232 N.Y.S. at 3.
214. See id. at 4. The court noted that:
[Defendant had] a personality which denotes the unusual and unique
artist and enables him to pick up the attention of an audience and hold it
interested, amused or in pathos until released. Where, therefore, the
services of the actor are shown to be unusual, unique or extraordinary
and that the damage to the plaintiff will be irreparable and unascertaina-
ble, the latter may enjoin the performer from appearing elsewhere dur-
ing the period of his contract, and, even though a negative covenant not
to appear elsewhere may be lacking, such will be implied ....
Id.
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 cmt. b (1981).
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tained for an artistic endeavor. If the performer may not compel
enforcement of the employer's affirmative covenant, may the artist
prohibit the employer from looking elsewhere for a replacement?
Under Illustration 2 to Section 367, "B [owner of opera house with
which singer A has contracted] discharges A and A sues for specific
performance. Even though singing at B's opera house would have
greatly enhanced A's reputation and earning power in an amount
that A cannot prove with reasonable certainty, specific performance
will be refused. ' 216 In the few published opinions touching this is-
sue, courts consistently have found monetary damages a wholly ade-
quate form of relief when it is the artist seeking the remedy.217
V. PROJECTIONS AND CONCLUSION
This is not, by all indications, a dead issue in entertainment
law. While there is nothing to suggest Lumley will be revisited any
time soon, its application remains alive and well. Recent articles
reported that the television actress, Sherry Stringfeld, whose depar-
ture from the series E.R. was said to be amicable, is nonetheless
barred by agreement from appearing in any television series for a
period of two years. Thus, she will presumably be permitted to pur-
sue her chosen field of employ while not, at least theoretically, of-
fering competition to her previous employer.
In the entertainment industry these days, however, not all part-
ings are amicable and not all battles are limited to weapons of gos-
sip and innuendo. In a July 1996 article entitled, So Long, Sue Ya
Later: When Stars Walk, Lawyers Talk, and Some of Hollywood's Biggest
Courtroom Scenes are not on Film,21 8 a California movie critic recited a
litany of actors who in recent days had walked off movie sets. 2 19
216. Id. illus. 2.
217. See Freund v. Washington Square Press, Inc., 357 N.Y.S.2d 857, 861-62
(N.Y. 1974) (discussing author's suit for breach of publishing contract).
218. Joe Baltake, So Long Sue Ya Later: When Stars Walk, Lawyers Talk, and Some
of Hollywood's Biggest Courtroom Scenes are not on Film, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 28, 1996,
at EN18.
219. See id. The article stated that "[y]ou probably already know about John
Travolta's highly publicized departure from a movie that was to be called 'The
Double'... and Val Kilmer's controversial decision not to do 'Batman and Robin
.... Id. But, the article noted that the list goes on:
Keanu Reeves has backed out of doing "Speed II," leaving directorJan De
Bont and co-star Sandra Bullock in the lurch; Holly Hunter has decided
to pass on James L. Brooks "Old Friends"; Meg Ryan changed her mind
about doing Don Roos' "Easy Women"; and even a filmmaker, Robert
Rodriguez, has jumped ship [from the Antonio Banderas version of
"Zorro").
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While the critic acknowledged that this phenomenon was not new,
he noted that "there's been a common thread of ingratitude run-
ning through some of the recent events that have taken place on
and off movie sets." He wondered whether there were unfulfilled
contractual obligations, written or oral, which, having been unful-
filled, could be the basis for legal action taken against them. 220
Kim Basinger's ill-fated defection from "Boxing Helena" is cited as
one example, and Whoopi Goldberg's unsuccessful attempt to back
out of the production of "Theodore Rex" is offered as another.
Basinger settled for $3.8 million in damages and Golberg eventually
succumbed and made the picture, which went straight to video
shelves. 22'
Another controversy arose when actor David Caruso withdrew
from the successful Steven Bochco NBC television show, "NYPD
Blue."2 22 Caruso recently began a new CBS show, "Michael Hayes,"
and the TV Guide notes with surprise that the "very adult drama"
will be scheduled at nine p.m. rather than ten, which would be op-
posite his former drama series. 223 While Caruso's agreement with
Steven Bochco when he was released from his five-year NYPD Blue
contract reputedly did not bar him from returning to television, he
was prohibited from appearing in direct competition with his for-
mer program. 224
If Bochco and NBC decided to challenge Caruso's new start,
one could envision the willing parade of critics eager to testify as to
the much maligned actor's "unique and irreplaceable" star quali-
ties, if such testimony would force Caruso off the airwaves. Ironi-
cally, it is unlikely that anyone, among Caruso's supporters or
detractors, would seek specific performance with the ulterior mo-
tive dating back to Lumley itself. If Caruso were banned from ap-
pearing on any other program, he would be compelled to return to
his former employer, thus presumably supplanting the actor, Jimmy
Smits, who took over when Caruso departed and earned critical
plaudits along the way. The goal, then, would have to be regarded
as punitive, rather than rehabilitative or compensatory relief.
Whether a court would recognize this as a valid policy underlying
enforcement of the negative covenant remains to be seen.
220. See id. The critic acknowledged that "[t] here's been a common threat of
ingratitude running through some of the recent events that have taken place on
and off movie sets." Baltake, supra note 218, at EN18.
221. See id.
222. See Robert Bianco, The Buzz, PIrrSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, Oct. 6, 1996, G2.
223. FALL PREVIEW, TV GUIDE, Sept. 13-19, 1997, at 3.
224. See id.
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